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Abstract 
The purpose of this article is to explore a newly defined concept of distributed 
cognition in a spatial domain and to propose how this conceptualization may be 
applied to how architectural space is organized. A novel view of distributed 
cognition is presented, which is concerned with the purposive behaviour of an 
organism-in-its-environment. We term this concept teleonomic distributed 
cognition. Teleonomic distributed cognition is the ability of an organism (including 
humans) to interact with its environment for the purpose of satisfying its 
physiological (internal and external) and social needs in order to survive and 
sustain itself. An implication of this approach is that the sensory capabilities that 












Architecture is intrinsically concerned with understanding and articulating spatial 
scenarios in order to improve or invent solutions for enhancing a given scenario to 
enrich the built environment, and consequently, human existence. However, 
architectural practice tends to rely on methods that tend to flatten spatial problems 
into something quantifiable so that they can be managed and planned. There is often 
a qualitative disconnect between the articulation of spatiality in the built environment 
and the spatiality of being. The issue of space is fundamental to the practice of 
architecture because people, society, space and environment are inexplicably linked. 
Human beings are intrinsically manipulators of their environment and are coupled to 
the world through their capacity to sense. The capacity to sense is the ability to 
distinguish differences in the environment that make a difference to us (Uexküll 
1957; Bateson 2000). Our sense-making capacities allow us access to, to interact 
with and to act in our environment. This article proposes a teleonomic distributed 
cognition approach to architectural design and outlines an approach to configuring 
architectural space on the premise that the conception of space, and the manner in 
which architects conceive of spatial organization, should be grounded in biological 
origins. 
Naturalizing space 
The idea of space only appeared in architectural discourse in the late nineteenth 
century when it became important in two ways: first as the embodiment of human 
activity inside the architectural form and second it became aligned to aesthetic ideas 
in an attempt to define beauty. The German art historian August Schmarsow 
extended the latter notion proclaiming space to be the essence of architecture, as an 
art (Schwarzer 1991). The issue of space whence became a central topic in 
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architectural discourse, leaving the realm of non-consideration and evolving towards 
consideration of space as an abstract concept. As such, space has achieved a hold 
on architectural thought due to the rise of the ‘intellectual’ architect, who seeks to 
expose the ‘nature’ of architecture and claim the high ground. Louis Kahn (one of the 
most influential architects of the twentieth century) claimed ‘space’ to be essential to 
the continual renewal of architecture, stating ‘architecture is the thoughtful making of 
spaces. The continual renewal of architecture comes from changing concepts of 
space’ (in Ven 1987: xi).  
Whilst the origin of space in architectural discourse is occupied with sensorial 
engagement with the environment the idea was transcribed from C19th scientific 
theories of vision concerned with how the mind and senses grasp three-dimensional 
forms and space. The ocular-centric focus thus promoted vision above the other 
senses, thereby objectifying space. Ever since classical science ‘mathematized’ 
space there has been an inclination to redefine what we understand space to be, to 
break its objectification and to tie space to being-in-the-world. We propose that in 
order to understand space we need to define its biological origins because space is 
a property of living things and of being in the world. 
The notion that space is intrinsic to being is acknowledgement of space as sensorial. 
Space is intrinsic to being, and essentially behavioural, effected through the capacity 
to interpret a difference. Our activities (or behaviour) are what effected the 
organization of built space since humankind first progressed from congregating 
around fire. In this respect, the psychologist, architect and design researcher Bryan 
Lawson remarks that architects ‘tend to consider space as an abstract concept and 
not a behavioural phenomenon, and yet paradoxically assume that behaviour will 
follow their predictions’ (2001: 200).  
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The significance of space even now is too often bypassed in architectural practice for 
aesthetic or commercial priorities. Architects tend to view space as an abstract 
concept and thus many built settings are ill-suited or ill-tuned to their inhabitants. 
However, these considerations are changing as acknowledgement exists that 
virtually everything a human is and does is associated with the experience of space. 
Anthropologist Edward T. Hall points out that our sense of space is a synthesis of 
many sensory inputs (visual, auditory, kinaesthetic, olfactory and thermal) 
constituting a complex system and that not only does each of our sensory apparatus 
constitute a complex system but that our experience is moulded and patterned by 
culture. He claims that there is no alternative but to conclude that people from 
different cultures live in different sensory worlds. Space is sensorial and ‘one of the 
basic, underlying organizational systems for all living things – particularly for people’ 
(Hall 1966: xii). Space needs, Hall states,  
 
may be as basic as the need for food. Not only does everything occur in a 
time-space plane (largely taken for granted), but the handling of space can 
be, and often is, a life and death matter for many organisms. (1963: 424) 
 
Formalizing space 
The French Marxist philosopher and sociologist Henri Lefebvre recognized the 
mental and physical aspects of space as intertwined and mediated through what he 
called spatial-practice, referring to habitual tendencies cast into the artefacts and 
structures that we inhabit. In other words, lived-space is the assimilation of physical 
and mental space. His ‘code’ expresses a tri-dialectic process whereby space is 
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created and creative effected through the relations between subjects, their space 
and surroundings, meaning that space is social because it unfolds through 
interaction. Frustrated with the Cartesian dichotomy, as ‘promoting the basic 
sophistry whereby the philosophico-epistemological notion of space is fetishized and 
the mental realm comes to envelop the social and physical ones’ (Lefebvre 1995: 5), 
Lefebvre sought to unify mental and physical space as mediating lived-space. 
Recognizing space reduced to a mental concept, he protests that the body is 
abstracted to ‘a simple mediation between subject and object’ as opposed to a 
practical, fleshy body ‘conceived of as a totality complete with spatial qualities’. As a 
social product, he states, ‘[s]pace is neither a “subject” nor an “object” but rather a 
social reality – that is to say, a set of relations and forms’ (Lefebvre 1995: 116). 
Emphasizing the social dimension of being in the world Lefebvre stresses that 
interaction is both mental and physical. ‘Space is social morphology: it is to lived 
experience what form itself is to the living organism, and just as intimately bound up 
with function and structure’ (Lefebvre 1995: 94). 
Drawing on Lefebvre’s tri-dialectic structure we can articulate typical cognizing of 
space as distinguished by the mental, physical and lived. ‘Mental space’ is abstract, 
what may be termed ‘a-space’, and pertains to the concepts, theories and ideas 
articulating what we think about space and engagement in the world. ‘Physical 
space’ equates to the corporeal environment and its representation, with respect to 
geometry and significantly to interpretations based in mathematics and physics. 
Euclidean Space is the typical representation and means by which we come to be 
taught to think about space at school. We thus refer to Physical space in this article 
as ‘e-space’. Lived-space is social, equating to everyday life. It is the space of 
organismic interaction and the spatiality of the organism-in-its-environment. We thus 
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refer to lived-space in this article as ‘o-space’. ‘E-space’ is the geometrical 
representation of o-space, rooted in a particular notion of the world: i.e. a-space. 
Being a ‘science of form’ into which we cast our experience to represent the shapes 
and forms that we perceive to understand and scrutinize them, and communicate 
spatial scenarios to one another. O-space is space as lived, and as a mediation of 
mental and physical space, emerges as a result of the coupling between organism 
and environment. Human-space is a form of o-space, equating to the spatial 
intelligence of human beings. We thus determine ‘o-space’ to be a product of 
interpretation effected through a mapping between mental and physical space, which 
effects lived space resulting in action: a cyclic process perception-interpretation-
action. Thus lived-space is affected by, and affects, the organism-in-its-environment, 
as depicted in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Lived-space is a mediation of the mental and physical dimensions of 
space. 
Space as an enabling constraint 
Everything in the physical everyday world is spatial and temporal, and through 
constraints is creative. The presence of something is productive because it affects 
something else. Affected through the ability to feel or perceive and affect the 
environment, lived-space is a (habitual) state of fluidity and perpetual readjustment 
articulated through an organism’s activity and interaction. We interact with the world 
through our senses, which define our spatial environment and which we use to 
‘navigate’ said environment. This is a condition that emerges and fluctuates as a 
result of a perceiving entity’s interpretation (which is conditional on the entity’s state) 
of its surroundings and the effect of this impression on the environment: a cyclical 
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process of feedback between internal and external factors that coalesce to effect 
action (Uexküll 1926).  
Space is organizational, in the sense that rudimentary constraints effect (through 
meaning) direction and distance in a relational sense. Space is experiential, and 
these factors are poly-dimensional. Being rudimentary the organizational properties 
are brute-facts, whereby actual existences and effects arise out of their relation to 
other things. The mediation of the experiential and organizational properties of space 
result in space as lived, being the regularities and habits of the organism-in-its-
environment. Habitual tendencies are cast into the artefacts and structures that 
organisms create: what Lefebvre called ‘spatial practice’. ‘The spatial practice of a 
society secretes that society’s space; it propounds and presupposes it, in a 
dialectical interaction; it produces it slowly and surely as it masters and appropriates 
it’ (Lefebvre 1995: 38), resulting in what may be referred to as niches of habitation. 
Organized by purposeful activity, an organism’s niche is a habitual condition effected 
at one scale by differences across boundaries and scales of composition (Hoffmeyer 
1998) and at another by differences to which the organism reacts and has intention 
towards (Uexküll 1926; Bateson 2000).  
The spatial significance of the physiological and social needs of organisms equate to 
what the developmental psychologist Howard Gardner terms ‘spatial intelligence’ 
(2011). Our awareness of the events and things surrounding us stem from our cells 
that constitute our bodies and their ‘calculating’ capacities. The spatiality of an 
organism is affected through its capacity to sense, which underpins perception and 
capacity to engage with the world. This ability (stemming from our cells) is ambient 
and distributed. A living-cell is, fundamentally, a semiotic-niche, meaning that it must 
master a set of signs by which it can control – or maintain – itself (Hoffmeyer 1998), 
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and like all living things acts according to physiological and social needs. Having the 
capacity to distinguish self-from non-self a cell is, thus, a model of the ontology of 
‘self’ (Weber 2009). The spatiality of an organism and its engagement with its 
surroundings may thus be extrapolated on the basis of cell/niche (inter)action – after 
all an organism is, at base, an ecosystem of cohabitating cell formations (Hoffmeyer 
1996) – which may be established as pertaining to interactions (or behaviours) that, 
if not indifferent, are either positive or negative. Taking the basic unit of existence to 
be the organism-in-its-environment (the living-cell being the nascent form), which is 
coupled to the world through its capacity to sense, and thus interpreting its 
surroundings establishes a biological notion of space. The spatial intelligence of an 
organism is affected through its capacity to sense, which underpins discernment of 
the environment and capacity to engage with the world. This ability (stemming from 
our cells) is ambient and distributed, and from this perspective space is ‘lived’. 
Effected through the ability to feel or perceive and affect the environment, space is a 
(habitual) state of fluidity and perpetual readjustment articulated through an 
organism’s activity and interaction. ‘Human-space’ may be comprehended on the 
basis that we are an eco-system of cohabitating cells that are continually exchanging 
‘information’ with their environment(s).1 In short our senses couple us to the world 
and our perception of the world defines our environment, what Jacob von Uexküll (a 
biologist) refers to as Umwelten, which defines the functional space of an organism 
(Uexküll 1926, 1957). Our spatial awareness and the capacity to ‘calculate’ our 
environment is ambient: i.e. it is intrinsic to our being: see footnote 1. Architect Leon 
van Schaik argues that intelligence is a distributed system: not something held like a 
command centre in the brain and then distributed, but something that is present 
throughout the organism. Spatial intelligence underpins our ability to engage with the 
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world and to perform, and, as van Schaik stresses, must be accounted for in the 
buildings that we design. He claims that spatial intelligence is the most under-
appreciated of the human intelligences because it is non-verbal, difficult to quantify 
and – using all of our senses – is more than visual. Spatial intelligence is early to be 
deployed, mastered as we learn to navigate in the world, and is soon relegated to 
our unconscious (Schaik 2008). 
The teleonomic distributed cognition approach described below attempts to bridge 
the gap that still exists between the sensorial approach taken by Hall, the social 
dimension espoused by Lefebvre and Gardner’s ‘spatial intelligence’ to the biological 
roots from which all human beings phylogenetically and ontogenetically evolved 
from. 
Teleonomic distributed cognition: An ectoderm-centric perspective 
The human organism may be viewed as ectoderm-centric because of its 
embryological development, i.e., after implantation in the uterus the fertilized oocyte 
develops into a multicellular human being. This process involves its transformation 
from a bi-laminar to a tri-laminar embryonic disc in the gastrulation process, which 
leads to the development of the human body form. The gastrulation process includes 
the formation of the primitive streak, development of the notochord and the 
differentiation of the three germ layers: the ectoderm, mesoderm and endoderm. 
This flat three-layer structure transforms into a three-dimensional structure that 
resembles a straw. The inner layer is the endoderm, the intermediate layer is the 
mesoderm and the outer layer is the ectoderm (Moore and Persaud 2003). The 
ectoderm develops into the epidermis including hair and nails, the central and 
peripheral nervous system and all of our senses. Thus the development of the 
ectoderm reveals a direct connection between our senses and the central nervous 
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system, the central nervous system being the in-turned portion of the external 
surface of the embryonic body. The development of this human organism begins 
from the time the sensory organs come online and start interacting with the 
surrounding environment, acquiring and processing stimuli from its inner and outer 
universe (Montagu 1978). Figure 2 shows this interaction where the autopoietic 
organism (Maturana and Varela 1987) or system engages recursively with the 
environment over time. This recursive engagement impacts both the autopoietic 
organism and the environment in a never-ending struggle, showing the ectoderm-
centric nature of human existence. Note also that other human organisms may be 
viewed from the perspective of the sole autopoietic organism as just part of the 
surrounding environment (see Figure 3). Resulting in a teleonomic cognitive process 
that is consensual and distributive in nature, i.e., social; human organisms and the 
surrounding environment are part and parcel of the cognitive process, making 
memory and history an essential component of the cognitive horizon.  
Figure 2: System-environment coupling (redrawn from Maturana and Varela 1987). 
Thus, the embodiment of teleonomic distributed cognition in the human organism is 
a matter of biological phylogenetic and ontogenetic development. Also, the 
object(ive) of a human organism is primarily and ultimately its consciously or 
unconsciously determined physiological needs, whatever their scope might be 
defined to be. We are born with that object(ive), and it persists to our last breath. 
Thus, a working definition of teleonomic distributed cognition is: the ability of an 
organism to interact with its environment for the purpose of satisfying its 
physiological (internal and external) and social needs to survive and sustain itself 
(Cardenas-Garcia 2013)2. A teleonomic process or behaviour is one which owes its 
goal-directedness to the operation of a program, which “is (1) something material, 
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and (2) exists prior to the initiation of the teleonomic process. Hence, it is consistent 
with a causal explanation” (Mayr 1974). Similarly, scientist Addy Pross in What is 
Life? states ‘Teleonomy, as a biological phenomenon, is empirically irrefutable […] 
all living things behave as if they have an agenda’ (2012: 9). 
An ectoderm-centric perspective of teleonomic distributed cognition serves to better 
understand how spatial intelligence, or the ability of an organism to interact with its 
environment (in space and time), is integral to being and is fundamental to 
experience, and emphasizes how organisms are capable of perceiving their 
environment only by means of their senses. Perception begins from the point our 
senses come into being. Our senses enable us to develop sensorial maps of our 
environment. A sensorial map is defined as a recognizable distribution of matter 
and/or energy that we can perceive. For example, in the case of touch these two- 
and three-dimensional sensorial maps occur all over our bodies because of the 
nature of our cutaneous sensors being deployed over areas of our skin. They might 
imply pressure, i.e., sharpness and bluntness; heat and/or cold; and even relative 
and absolute positioning of our bodily members. A touch sensorial map may be 
perceived initially as a pressure and/or a temperature distribution varying over the 
skin surface. In time, due to the repetitive nature of such sensory distributions the 
human organism is capable of discerning repeated occurrences that are similar in 
nature, even though they might be occurring over different regions of the skin 
surface, allowing for differences in these sensorial maps to be noticed. That 
discernment of a difference, i.e., that difference that makes a difference to someone 
is information (Bateson 2000). The processing of said information leads to the 
formulation of patterns in evaluating our environment, which make for a simplified 
perspective of our interactions with our environment with our bodily members. 
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Indeed such discernment is neither nothing more nor less than ‘spatial intelligence’ 
and utilizes all of our senses in developing it, and allows for continued interactions 
with our environment. 
The subjective/objective organism 
Figure 3 shows the human homoeostatic organism in interaction with its 
environment. The environment encompasses both the niche in which the human 
organism resides and other human organisms that are the unavoidable companions 
of our human existence. Note that the ‘Basic Unit of Analysis’ is shown to be the sole 
individual at the left of Figure 3 interacting in its niche and with the individual on the 
right. In these interactions this sole individual has as its driving motivation the 
satisfaction of its ‘physiological (internal and external) and social needs’. These 
needs may be characterized as being personal/subjective/relative (Personal-
Subjective-Relative view or PSR view) and influence our view of reality such that the 
sole criterion that we know to avoid is any action that threatens our survival and 
sustenance. Since unavoidably we are surrounded by other human individuals, we 
need to come to terms with them. These interactions with other human organisms 
with a different Personal-Subjective-Relative view of reality are useful to us only if 
they lead to collaborative relationships. One such unavoidable collaborative relation 
is that between mother and child, where the collaboration leads on the one hand to 
the survival of the child and on the other to the survival of the species. Such 
collaboration requires the finding of ‘common ground’ or points of agreement, i.e., a 
consensual space between the Personal-Subjective-Relative views of each 
individual, a ‘Shared Universe’ within those two different and differing Personal-
Subjective-Relative views. This consensual space brings forth an 
impersonal/objective/absolute perspective (Impersonal-Objective-Absolute view or 
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IOA view) that allows for a ‘Shared Universe’ and collaboration, and leads, from a 
spatial perspective, to positive interaction and union. Of course, difference of opinion 
and disagreement may also be discovered, leading either to indifference or 
disjunction between individuals with differing Personal-Subjective-Relative views or 
opposing Impersonal-Objective-Absolute views between groups. While the finding of 
a ‘Shared Universe’ might have the implication of Maturana’s3 ‘inter-objectivity’ 
(2005), it is suggested to be more general as it might result from human or 
organismic behaviours that are outside of the realm of languaging. 
Figure 3: The Personal-Subjective-Relative view and Impersonal-Objective-Absolute 
view of organism interactions. 
In this process of recursive interactions individuals learn to reconcile their Personal-
Subjective-Relative views and in so doing develop a joint consensual Impersonal-
Objective-Absolute view, which may be beneficial to both. Notice that the existence 
of an Impersonal-Objective-Absolute view presupposes the existence of at least two 
Personal-Subjective-Relative views. The process of exploration, observation and 
discovery is a Personal-Subjective-Relative process, but the process of coming to 
terms so that this Personal-Subjective-Relative view is accepted by a larger 
community is an Impersonal-Objective-Absolute process, a socialization process. 
The Personal-Subjective-Relative view and the Impersonal-Objective-Absolute view 
coexist and develop over time. This process may also be viewed from the 
perspective of the scientific method and the inherency of the scientific method to 
lead to changing results with time due to the ever-changing nature of individual 
exploration, observation and discovery leading to human interactions and 
acceptance or rejection of said individual exploration, observation and discovery. For 
example, the (IOA) view that the earth is flat became overturned by the Personal-
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Subjective-Relative view of Galileo, which, being initially unique, became 
Impersonal-Objective-Absolute as the dominant view of the world shared by all. On a 
more basic level Figure 4 shows an example of the concerted actions of two ants 
with differing Personal-Subjective-Relative views focused on their prey based on the 
primacy of the ‘Shared Universe’ of an Impersonal-Objective-Absolute view. This 
Personal-Subjective-Relative/Impersonal-Objective-Absolute perspective is believed 
to be generally applicable to all organisms within their own niche. 
Figure 4: Illustrating the Personal-Subjective-Relative view and the Impersonal-
Objective-Absolute view of ants. 
The Personal-Subjective-Relative/Impersonal-Objective-Absolute view of organism 
interaction (described above as articulating the scientific method) may also be 
extended to the process of design and the procuring of a design project (such as a 
building) in the sense that a designer needs to ‘sell a story’ or to ‘convince’ others of 
the value of a proposal or idea that they then ‘buy into’. This equates to the 
translation of the designers Personal-Subjective-Relative view into a collective 
Impersonal-Objective-Absolute view. The development of a design proposal is the 
continual development of the Personal-Subjective-Relative/Impersonal-Objective-
Absolute view of the design team and their stakeholders, the point being that the 
process described is social and thus expressive/applicable to understanding the 
process of designing a building because it is a social process effected through 
collaboration and the ‘buying into’ of ideas. 
In summarizing, it is noted that teleonomic distributed cognition has two salient 
elements: a Personal-Subjective-Relative view and an Impersonal-Objective-
Absolute view. The Personal-Subjective-Relative view relates to the satisfaction of 
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‘[…] physiological (internal and external) and social needs […]’, while the 
Impersonal-Objective-Absolute view relates to the requirement of the organism ‘[…] 
to survive and sustain itself […]’ as the organism interacts with its environment. 
 
Configuration: A spatial problem 
The spatiality of an organism is an effect of its teleonomic distributed cognition and 
its capacity to affect its environment. On the basis that design is a constructive 
activity (Glanville 2006) we propose a distributed approach to design. This and the 
following section serve to illustrate how we propose the preceding conceptualization 
may be applied. We focus on the diagrammatic-cogitating-unravelling stage of the 
design process ௅ namely the point at which an architect scrutinizes and deliberates 
the spatial parameters of an architectural brief and determines the overall 
organization of the building: a point in which architectural space is tied to users, with 
regard to behaviour, function and context. Taking an agent-based modelling 
approach, we propose that the teleonomic distributed cognition of organismic 
engagement in the world may be cast into an artificial archetypal organism. Focusing 
on the sensorial capacities of organisms we seek to capitalize on the dynamic and 
generative processes involved to express the niche dynamics of inhabitation, the 
intention being to define an approach to configuring space that enables designerly 
thought the capacity to think about everyday life and engagement in the world in a 
manner that focuses on the spatiality of the organism-in-its-environment. 
Architectural templates 
Architects use reference models as a basis for organizing a building, drawing on 
conventional arrangements that describe spatial arrangement according to a 
particular type of building. Building typologies are standardized spatial 
16 
arrangements, pertaining to function, specifying a basic pattern or set of constraints 
to satisfy a particular scenario. Experience also provides templates in the form of 
previous buildings, ideas or projects that may be drawn on for reference. However, 
an architectural-template is not necessarily the plan of a previous building used as a 
model from which to make judgements. What may be termed a ‘spatial-template’ 
may be cognitive or environmental, in the sense that the environment, or specifically 
a given site, holds cues affecting a response or specific actions. Templates, as 
Ethologist Guy Theraulaz et al. claim of social insects (2003), are internal and 
external. Templates can occur both in the intellect of the designer (i.e. held internally, 
with regard to experience, education and reference models) and in the environment 
(the site conditions, and on an abstract level ‘spatial practice’). The template may be 
understood as both determined, as is the case with a reference or an internal model, 
or as emergent in the case of differences present in the environment. These two 
forms of template are typically coupled in architectural design in a process of fitting 
reference models to a given site. In another (more abstract) sense the environment 
equates to the design medium. For example, using a pen and paper lines are drawn. 
The next line is affected by the previous one. As a pattern forms, the reference 
model is adapted to suit. Basically, a blank canvas is a homogenous field. By 
drawing a line a difference occurs and the homogeneity is broken – in much the 
same way polymath George Spencer-Brown’s ‘mark of distinction’ is the elemental 
feature in his Laws of Form. Further lines create more difference and degrees of 
heterogeneity. In this sense a spatial configuration created by an architect is at a 
basic level akin to an organism responding to differences in its environment, in that a 
pattern arises out of the reading of cues: in the sense of a conversation, which 
occurs through the observer ‘reading’ and responding to the differences observed 
17 
(Glanville 2006). This is intertwined with reference models, experience and 
education, the site and the design medium. Responses are made to the 
interpretation of distinctions between differences. Reference models are fitted to the 
site through experience and education, achieved through a process of interplay 
defined by the design medium and the reading of differences created in the unfolding 
process of designing.  
At the most basic level, this outlines the career of an organism, adapting to and 
altering its environment to sustain (and enhance) itself. Qualities of the environment 
are mapped and translated into actions. On the basis that all living things dwell and 
in so doing affect their environment in some way, designing may, in essence, be 
extrapolated in much the same way we perceive the teleonomic distributed cognition 
(and spatial intelligence) of the organism-in-its-environment, in the sense that 
properties of a particular scenario are mapped onto a given situation, which is then 
articulated in some way. Deemed to be a primitive condition created through 
interaction, space (or more specifically spatial configuration) emerges and fluctuates 
as a result of an organism’s interpretation of its surroundings. This interpretation is 
conditional on the state of the organism and the effect of this impression on the 
environment: a cyclical process of feedback between internal and external factors 
that coalesce to effect action. This is the process of designing, a morphological 
process characterized by ‘intentionality’, whereby space is organizational, not in the 
sense of thought or consciousness but of orientation: what may be referred to as 
telos. It is a reflexive condition that is created and creative, in continual reinvention. 
However, whilst changeable it is habitual, in the sense that things have a tendency to 
act as they did on a former occasion than otherwise (Peirce 1992). It is these 
habitual tendencies that are cast into the artefacts and built structures that 
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organisms, and designers, create. This habitual tendency, however, is not fixed and 
is not the same as replicating arrangements taken from previous plans, which serves 
to maintain convention, as it relates to tendency and may thus change (or evolve) 
depending on the pressures exerted. 
Inhabitation as a system of activities 
The process of arranging room layouts is a key activity in the process of designing a 
building that requires skill and is intrinsically an (abstract) spatially cognitive activity. 
Planning is the usual way of systematically working through the arrangement of 
activities in a building, and for all intents and purposes is the process through which 
an understanding of the building programme is determined. Working out the 
organization of a building is one of the most important and taxing aspects of the 
design process concerned with the physical arrangement of objects and spaces 
within a room, building or site to fulfil the requirements of diverse human activities. 
Identified by design theorists Horst Rittel and Melvin M. Weber as wicked (1973) the 
success of the plan is in abstracting such problems into two dimensions, defining a 
plane to render them manageable, whereby the numerous intertwined components 
may be arranged. The problem of organizing plan layouts is combinatorially hard and 
has received considerable attention in the fields of architecture and engineering, 
particularly since the computer came to be utilized as a tool for analysis and design. 
In practice (whether computational or not) the process of allocating a collection of 
spatial components according to certain design criteria is a process of trial and error, 
determined by topological and geometrical relations. Architects often fall back on 
previous plans that provide a template enabling the architect to judge and construct 
a solution by interlacing the template with particular design criteria.  
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We view activities as ‘building blocks’, which may be combined to define a particular 
pattern of habitation. Such patterns distinguish typologies, whereby buildings are 
classified by function. Scrutinizing built structures enables us to consider ‘lived-
space’ retrospectively as a system of social relations and to thereby extrapolate 
particular rules, or patterns, of inhabitation. Architectural theorists Bill Hillier and 
Julienne Hanson transported themselves within the plans of built forms to analyse 
their organization and illustrated how the configuration of space alters when 
specified from the perspective of each distinct area constituting a planned 
arrangement (1984). Identifying the forms of planned space to be heterogeneous 
they reveal buildings to be systems of activity defined by the dynamics of social and 
cultural goings-on. Perceived in this way ‘space’ exhibits structure and constitutes 
organization, becoming a sort of medium, perceived as a system of relations, 
articulating what Lefebvre claims of space. That ‘[s]pace is social morphology: it is to 
lived experience what form itself is to the living organism, and just as intimately 
bound up with function and structure’ (Lefebvre 1995: 94). 
5.2.1. The archetypal building block 
An activity in isolation is meaningless. Living things are in constant motion, and so it 
transfers to the things we do. We do things in relation to what we have done before 
and what we will do next. A pattern of habitation is a mesh of intertwined chain-like 
relations, determined by the activities taking place. The occurrence of an activity is 
functional because all activities are connected. Even though an activity may be 
separate from another (having no specific or physical relation to an adjoining activity) 
its existence may affect another. Architect William Mitchell defines ‘function’ as an 
action with an effect, deemed functional in relation to context (1998). The engineer, 
biologist-cum-philosopher and computer scientist George Kampis states that ‘the 
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notion of function enters into a system description when some teleology […] is 
supposed to work in the system’ (1987: 143). An activity and its functional definition 
are determined by its association to corresponding activities: that an activity is 
defined by another activity, by which it is affected and another activity that it affects. 
Perceived as a chain, an activity has an input and output, thereby goal-directed in an 
indirect and recursive way, in the sense that something (A) affects something else 
(B) in a manner that supports ‘B’ to be or behave in the manner of ‘B’. In this way an 
activity (or specifically function) is defined by a causal chain of connections. An 
activity is therefore defined functionally as a component, whose function is 
participation in the production (or articulation) of other activities. 
The amalgamation, or association, of one activity with another depends on the 
constraints and criteria of the activities concerned and their relations in a particular 
context. It is the combination of activities performed in relation to a particular 
purpose, task, event or function that articulate spatial organization – in the sense that 
our actions fuse and define our patterns of spatiality, stipulating a particular form of 
habitation: what may be referred to as a ‘niche’. Organized by purposeful activity, an 
organism’s niche is a habitual condition affected at one scale by differences across 
boundaries and scales of composition (Hoffmeyer 1998) and at another by 
differences to which the organism reacts and has intention towards (Uexküll 1926; 
Bateson 2000). This reflexive condition is effected on the one hand by what a subject 
does and on the other by the effect of space on the subject. In short, activity creates 
space – space generates activity. On the premise that the discrete activities forming 
a particular pattern (or routine) of inhabitation may be extrapolated we may say, in 
principle, that the basic building block in shaping the built environment is ‘activity’. 
Furthermore, that spatial configuration is driven by sensorial capacities arising from 
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the dynamic organizational property of habit: of doing something, that something 
being an action directed towards some purpose (activity) that is effected through 
perception and the state of the subject, conditioned by circumstance and the affect 
that the environment has on the individual. In short inhabitation is a combination of 
activities that take place in some location and have relation to other activities with 
which they are connected, are a part of, overlap or are adjacent to. The casting of 
our proclivity to inhabit is typically determined through planning, the process of which 
tends to focus on adjacency and connectivity on the basis of e-space. Spatial 
relations constitute much greater variance than the typical focus allows for.  
A teleonomic distributed cognition perspective of configuration 
The configuration of architectural space may be enhanced if the early 
(programmatic) stages of design were to be approached on the basis of organism-
environment relations. Advocating an artificial life approach we propose agent-based 
modelling as a means of translating the potential relations intrinsic to the organism-
in-its environment into spatial factors for the purpose of organizing space in a 
distributed process of configuration. By taking an agent-based modelling approach 
we seek to capitalize on the agents’ discrete timing, spacing, goals, means and 
ends. Representing discrete activities as agents, which will self-organize according 
to their spatial relations, the idea is to capitalize on the dynamic and generative 
processes intrinsic to niche interaction to determine an arrangement pertaining to a 
particular ‘pattern’ of dwelling.  
The basic purpose of a building is to shape and manage activity. Hillier proposes that 
the relation between space and the act of living lies in the relations between 
configurations of people and configurations of space. ‘Encountering, congregating, 
avoiding, interacting, dwelling, conferring are not attributes of individuals, but 
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patterns, or configurations, formed by groups or collections of people’ (1996: 20), 
which arise collectively through activity in the process of everyday life. The possible 
relations between individuals, and the activities they perform, equate to interactions. 
Visualized as a bubble form surrounding the individual in the pursuit of some task we 
may envisage how these interactions lead to conformations depending on whether 
the association between one ‘activity-niche’ and another is positive or negative, 
which may affect deformations according to the force associated. See Figure 5.  
Figure 5: Niche conformation effected by organism interaction. 
The patterns depicted in Figure 5 (stemming from Smith and Varzi) are social, 
relating to various cases of two-tenant/two-niche interaction. These may be 
extrapolated to define a series of relation potentials (depicted in Figure 6) to illustrate 
possible forms of interaction that give rise to the sorts of association that one agent 
may have with another. The forms of association, being social, equate to degrees of 
consolidation. We might, in the first instance, imagine a friendly encounter, whereby 
the individuals are allied or congenial: a sociable condition in which the niches 
combine or fuse, articulated by ‘a’ and ‘b’. Of course ‘a’ may also be viewed 
negatively, as dominance. A positive encounter may transpire, whereby the two join 
but remain separate, as in‘d’, which may alternatively be a case of hostility. In the 
case of ‘c’ the two may be disassociated while having a neutral disposition to one 
another, in which case the two niches remain separate but may overlap. Else there 
may be hostility, or one may be contrary to the other, causing deformation (in the 
case of ‘d’) or repulsion (in the case of ‘e’). We thus see (from left to right) instances 
of coupling, nonchalance, encounter (which may be a collision or impingement) and 
contrast (which may be conflict or incompatibility). Withstanding ‘c’ and ‘e’ the 
exchanges lead to deformation. These forms of interaction are applied as possible 
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forms of association between agents, depicting discrete activities, to serve as the 
basis for their agency. These associations thus define the manner in which the 
agents may interact and how their association may be projected spatially. Figure 6 
illustrates how these interactions may be projected spatially to define a series of 
relation-potentials that are subsumptive. The relation-potentials distinguish the 
spatial-property of a relation as a scale, not of dimension but as a gradient, or 
degree of consolidation.  
Figure 6: Potential relations occurring between one activity-niche (agent) and 
another. 
Applying these potential relations to the forms of association between one activity 
and another we transfer the form of conformation between one activity-niche and 
another into behaviours. We thus propose modelling a collection of discrete activities 
(as agents) pertaining to a particular spatial scenario (or more specifically a building 
programme) such that the concluding pattern is something that emerges through the 
interrelations between agents representing various discrete activities: on the premise 
that ‘buildings transmit information through their interior structures, defining particular 
patterns, or formations, of space’ (Hillier and Hanson 1984). The notion is that the 
proposed method of configuration might unveil the intrinsic pattern underlying a 
particular programme of habitation, generating a pattern of space – or spatial 
morphology – in relation to configurations generated through associational networks 
of an array of activities pertinent to a given programme. 
The agents represent a region of space specific to a discrete activity constituting an 
archetypal organism, which has the capacity to distinguish self from non-self, and 
thus affect and be affected by its environment. A difference detected may affect an 
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agent by constituting a force, affecting it in a centrifugal (attract) or a centripetal 
(repel) manner, thereby influencing its conformation (as in Figure 6), state or 
position. Differences are therefore ‘observed’ by an agent as a result of their 
meaning. Such a model would enable a process whereby configuration is the result 
of the multiplicity of interactions between agents with their own timing, spacing, 
goals, means and ends. At its most basic level the attract-repel mechanism in the 
model relates to social relations that contrast, defining conditions analogous to 
situations between activities that have conflicting social properties, such as one 
being public and the other private or environmental properties where the effect of 
one is noise whilst the requirement of another is quiet. In such cases one agent will 
seek to evade the other. However, the properties of activity are not so 
straightforward as our activities take on different characters in relation to context and 
the disposition of the ‘actor’. For example, the activity of writing this article fluctuates 
from sitting in silence to ‘requiring’ noise (music), from sitting to standing and, at 
times, pacing, and at other times turns to the distinct activity of making tea. 
Therefore the associations between the activity of ‘working’ (i.e. writing this article) 
and other activities alter. The associations are not fixed. An activity has tendencies, 
and these fluctuate depending on physiological and social needs. 
The idea is that the agents conformation (or specifically that of the activity-niche) and 
thus the concluding configuration are determined by the behaviour of the agent 
population, whereby the agents adapt to their environment according to the 
differences that they ‘perceive’. Relating this to how people respond to their 
changing environment and how our activities change or the way we alter our 
surroundings to reflect (for example) a changing climate we can see how the activity-
niches transformation may reflect this: changing from one stable state to another. 
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Before detecting a difference an agent is in one state, but detecting ‘a difference’ it 
will respond to that difference and settle into another state once that difference has 
been ‘accommodated’: i.e. it reconfigures its boundary conformation to changing 
conditions. The proposed model outline thus reflects how an organism moves from a 
stable spatial domain, representing a given understanding of said spatial domain at a 
specific time, to another stable but different spatial domain due to the organism 
sensing changes in its environment and adapting to such changes. For example, in 
much the same way that the internal state of an organism may change according to 
external perturbations, an inhabitant sensing a changing climate may alter the 
configuration of his or her living quarters to accommodate or embrace changing 
external conditions, thereby satisfying physiological needs. The proposition is an 
analogue of a bottom-up approach to architectural design that takes into account that 
we as organisms interact with our ever-present changing environment and redefine 
our spatial domain depending on our sensory interaction with the said environment. 
The changes affecting our sensory interaction are not only physiological, but are 
social too. For example, whilst we might engage in seasonal changes of our living 
quarters due to perceiving changes in our spatial domain consequent to external 
conditions, changes may also occur as a result of social or life events. 
This is not the modelling of people’s movement or goings-on but a conceptual 
representation of behaviour. In an abstract sense human beings are perceived as 
agents running within a maze of interrelated, integrated, entwined activity patterns. It 
is the performance of activity, influenced by context, which generates space, and 
defines spatial configuration in the context of designing conditions of spatial 
patterning, the point being to determine an approach to spatial configuration that is 
implicitly representative of the organism-in-its-environment: i.e. its action and being.   
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Conclusion 
This article explores the newly defined concept of teleonomic distributed cognition in 
a spatial and temporal domain and proposes how this conceptualization may be 
applied to how architectural space is organized. The modelling methodology outlined 
explores a biological definition of space and organization. The proposition is based 
on the distinction of a difference, and as such, the capacity of an organism to sense 
and its coupling to its environment, that this is spatial, and thus expressive of spatial 
intelligence, presenting a platform from which the authors aim to develop an 
approach to generating (architectural) spatial formations that articulate the ‘nature’ of 
inhabitation. The approach outlined in section 6 describes how the conceptual 
position presented (in Sections 2–5) may be actualized. Just as ‘the proof of the 
pudding is in the eating’ the next step in this project is to develop the agent-based 
model outlined in Section 6 to apply the theoretical perspective and to test any 
results from the implementation.  
Space as lived must be tallied with the traditional conceptualization of mathematized 
space because whilst space has geometrical and topological characteristics it is 
actualized through behaviour. There is a binding connection and reciprocal influence 
between the environment of an organism and its behaviour that affects the 
organism´s being and the activities that it performs. As such there is a structural 
coupling between intention and the environment, in much the same way that space 
as lived and mathematized space are two sides of the same coin. Architectural 
space may thus be derived from the properties of unity between an organism and its 
environment or another organism that may be construed as part of that environment. 
The premise is therefore that some characteristics of space comply with those of a 
complex adaptive system that produces its own organization in response to 
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differences in its environment. Our proposal is an attempt to translate these 
differences (information) into ‘object’ to articulate spatial intelligence, casting the 
teleonomic distributed cognition of an organism into a method of generating 
architectural spatial formations.  
A critique of the approach argued for may be that buildings generally allow for the 
fluctuating and changing demands of inhabitants. Buildings may be adapted and 
altered, and rooms often allow for changes in the inhabitants idiosyncrasies. This is 
true of many buildings. Looking at residential buildings, for example, Victorian and 
Georgian town houses (in the United Kingdom) are commonly occupied in ways that 
vary widely today from the style of living that they were originally intended for. This is 
the merit of such house forms. But space standards are squeezed in today’s 
economic climate and few people live in a house design specifically for them. The 
Royal Institute of British Architects recent campaign (Homewise: Without Space + 
Light) highlights the impact of space on the way we live our lives. The approach 
argued for ways to address the imbalance that Lawson (2001) and van Schaik 
(2008) highlight by focusing on our coupling to our environment and how this is 
effected through teleonomic distributed cognition.   
In closely examining the process of architectural practice we find that it corresponds 
to a process of teleonomic distributed cognition where spatial intelligence is not only 
a requirement but also a consequence for its practice. Recognizing it as such lends 
clarity to the design process. Identifying the Personal-Subjective-Relative and 
Impersonal-Objective-Absolute aspects emphasizes the sociality of design as a 
process in which stakeholders need to recognize the value of their unique Personal-
Subjective-Relative views as intrinsic and fundamental to achieving the Impersonal-
Objective-Absolute view that projects require to make them effective. 
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Figure 4: Illustrating the Personal-Subjective-Relative view and Impersonal-Objective-


























 We argue that spatial awareness is intrinsic to all living things because living things 
are coupled to their environment and interact with their environment through their 
capacity to sense (i.e. that they can detect differences in) and affect their 
environment. This view is elucidated by the theoretical biologist Jacob von Uexküll, 
who explicates a bio-cybernetic and semiotic explanation of the organism-in-its-
environment and establishes a biological conception of space (1926). Our argument 
is theoretical and confined to the sensorial capacities and general condition of a 
token organism-in-its-environment: the living cell being the fundamental form. We do 
not refer to types, or individuals, for which studies show that people’s spatial 
cognitive abilities differ (Hegarty et al. 2006; Marchette et al. 2011; Weisberg et al. 
2014). Such studies scrutinize people’s ability to navigate, to establish their spatial 
cognitive abilities. These scientific studies are concerned with the capacity of 
individuals to navigate, distinguish and articulate features in the environment to 
understand (spatial) cognition and establish their ability to cognize spatial scenarios. 
We account for the organism-in-its-environment as both a subjective and an 
objective being (that it has a PSR and an IOA view: see Section 4), whereas the said 
studies tend to focus on the validity of subjective spatial awareness and the objective 
capacities of individuals. 
2
 This definition is distinct from that of Hutchins (2006), who defines distributed 
cognition as ‘an approach to the study of all cognition’ where ‘cognition is distributed 
across brains, bodies, and a culturally constituted world’. Thus Hutchins’ ‘distributed 
cognition is not a kind of cognition at all, it is a perspective on cognition’. Further, it 
has no connection to the biological origins of a human organism and that is the 
principal distinction that is being made here.  
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